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## THE POLISH QUESTION.

The following dispatch has been addressed by Earl Russell to Lord Napier, Her Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 11, 1863.

My Lord: On the 18th of last month Baron Brunow communicated to me a dispatch which he had received the evening before from Prince Gortschakoff.

The dispatch, of which I inclose a copy, is far from being a satisfactory answer to the representation which, in concert with France and Austria, Her Majesty's Government addressed to the Cabinet of St. Peters-

burg.

The dispatch begins, indeed, by stating that "the Imperial Cabinet admits the principle that every Power signing a treaty has a right to interpret its sense from its own point of view, provided that the interpretation remains within the limits of the meaning that it is possible to put upon it according to the text itself." Prince Gortschakoff adds: "In virtue of this principle the Imperial Cabinet does not dispute this right on the part of any one of the eight Powers which have concurred in the general Act of Vienna of 1815."

Prince Gortschakoff, however, departing widely from the question of the interpretation of the Treaty of Vienna, proceeds to ascribe the continuance of the insurrection in Poland to the moral and material assistance which it receives from without; admits vaguely the six points; rejects the proposed suspension of hostilities; refuses to accept a Conference of the eight Powers who signed the treaty; and finally declares that the re-establishment of order must precede the serious application of any measures destined for the pacification of Poland.

Her Majesty's Government will now proceed to examine calmly the principal topics of Prince Gortschakoff's reply to the considerations brought before him in my dispatch. Prince Gortschakoff, while he admits that confidence on the part of the governed, and the ascendancy of law over arbitrary power, must be the foundation of order and stability, adds that the indispensable corollary to these principles is respect for authority. But the Russian Cabinet cannot be ignorant that clemency and conciliation are often more effective in establishing respect for authority than material force. It would be a lamentable error to seek to restore that respect by force of arms alone, without the addition of some adequate security for the political and religious rights of the subjects of the King of Poland. Such security the proposals of the three Powers held out to Russia and to Poland alike.

It has pleased the Cabinet of St. Petersburg not to avail itself of this mode of restoring respect for authority.

2. Prince Gortschakoff affirms—and this view is the theme of the beginning and end of his dispatch—that

the re-establishment of order in Poland is dependent upon a condition to which he had called the attention of the Government of her Britannic Majesty, "and which is not only unfulfilled, but is not even alluded to in the dispatch of Lord Russell; we refer to the material assistance and moral encouragements obtained from abroad by the insurgents."

Her Majesty's Government would have been glad to have avoided this topic, and, instead of commenting on the past, to refer only to healing measures for the future.

But thus compelled by Prince Gortschakoff's reference to allude to the subject, Her Majesty's Government have no hesitation in declaring their conviction that the principal obstacle to the re-establishment of order in Poland is not the assistance obtained by the insurgents from abroad, but the conduct of the Russian Government itself.

The Empress Catherine, in 1772, promised to the Poles the maintenance of their religion. The Emperor Alexander I., in 1815, promised to the Poles national representation and national administration.

These promises have not been fulfilled. During many years the religion of the Poles was attacked, and to the present hour they are not in possession of the political rights assured to them by the treaty of 1815, and the Constitution of the same year.

The violation of these solemn engagements on the part of the Russian Government produced disaffection, and the sudden invasion of the homes of Warsaw, in a night of January last, was the immediate cause of the present insurrection.

Unless the general feeling in Poland had been estranged from Russia, the moral and material assistance afforded from abroad would have availed the insurgents little. It is true, however, that lively sympathy has been excited in Europe in favor of the Poles. In every considerable State where there exists a national representation—in England, in France, in Austria, in Prussia, in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, in Sweden, in Denmark—that sympathy has been manifested. Wherever there is a national administration, the administration has shared, though with prudence and reserve in expression, the feelings of the Legislature and the nation.

Russia ought to take into account these sympathies

Russia ought to take into account these sympathies, and profit by the lesson which they teach.

3. Prince Gortschakoff lays much stress on the fact, which cannot be denied, that "the insurgents demand neither an amnesty nor an autonomy, nor a representation more or less complete."

But it would be a mistake to suppose that, in cases of this kind, there are only two parties—viz: the Government occupied in suppressing the insurrection, and the leaders of the insurgents busy in fomenting and extending it. Besides these parties there is always in such cases a large floating mass who would be quite contented to see persons and property secure under a just and beneficent Administration. The confidence of this mass has not been obtained, and their continued inaction can hardly be depended upon.

Her Majesty's Government must again represent the extreme urgency of attempting at once the work of conciliation, which is so necessary for the general interest.

In profiting by the loyal and disinterested assistance which is offered her by Austria, France and Great Britain, the Court of Russia seems to herself to

Britain, the Court of Russia secures to herself the most powerful means toward making ideas of moderation prevail in Poland, and thus laying the foundations of permanent peace.

4. In referring to the Treaty of Vienna, Prince Gortschakoff says that "We should not be far from the truth if we affirmed that the first article of the Treaty of Vienna was prepared by and directly emanated from his Majesty the Emperor Alexander I."

Her Majesty's Government readily admit the probability of this supposition. In 1815, Great Britain, Austria, France and Prussia would have preferred to the arrangement finally made a restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Poland as it existed prior to the first partition of 1772, or even the establishment of a new independent Kingdom of Poland, with the same limits as the present kingdom.

The great army which the Emperor Alexander then had in Poland, the important services which Russia had rendered to the alliance, and, above all, a fear of the renewal of the war in Europe, combined to make Great Britain, Austria and Prussia accept the arrangement proposed by the Emperor Alexander, although it was, in their eyes, of the three arrangements in contemplation the one least likely to produce permanent peace and security in Europe.

But the more her Majesty's Government see in the decision adopted the prevailing influence of Russia, the more they are impressed with the conviction that the Emperor of Russia ought to be, of all sovereigns, the most desirous to observe the conditions of that arrangement.

It would not be open to Russia to enjoy all the benefits of a large addition to her dominions, and to repudiate the terms of the instrument upon which her tenure depends.

In stating these terms, Prince Gortschakoff says that the only stipulation which can have made it appear doubtful that the Emperor of Russia possessed the kingdom of Poland by the same title as that by which he holds his other possessions—the only one which could make his rights dependent upon any conditions whatever—is contained in two passages which he proceeds to quote.

But there is another passage which he does not quote. It is found in the beginning of the first article, and says:

"The duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of the provinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of by the following articles, is united to the Russian Empire, to which it shall be irrevocably attached by its Constitution, and be possessed by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his heirs and successors, in perpetuity."

Were not a national representation intended by this article, it would have been sufficient to say, "to which it shall be irrevocably attached," without any mention of a Constitution.

It is therefore evident that the Constitution is the

It is, therefore, evident that the Constitution is the link by which Poland was connected with Russia. It is important to know what this Constitution was which united Poland and Russia. It was not prescribed by the treaty; it was not promulgated by the European Powers; its construction was left entirely to the Emperor Alexander; but, nevertheless, when once promulgated, it must be taken to be the Constitution meant by the framers of the treaty of Vienna.

It was for this reason that Her Majesty's Government proposed as the second of the six points laid before the

Government of Russia, "national representation with powers similar to those which are fixed by the Charter of the 15th (27th) November, 1815."

5. Passing to the specific propositions of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortschakoff says, in regard to the six points, that the greater part of the measures which were pointed out by the three Powers "have already been decreed or prepared on the initiative of our august master."

Toward the end of the dispatch an allusion is made to "the measures which His Majesty adheres to, both in the germs already laid down, and in the development of them which he has allowed to be foreseen."

The passage, though far from being a definite assurance either of a national representation with efficacious means of control, or of a national administration, gives some hope that the Emperor Alexander will ultimately listen to the inspirations of his own benevolent disposition and to the counsels of Europe.

The proposal of a suspension of hostilities is rejected "in justice to the Emperor's faithful army, to the peaceable majority of Poles, and to Russia, on whom these agitations impose painful sacrifices."

The proposal of a Conference of the Powers who signed the treaty of Vienna is rejected, and with it the prospect of an immediate and friendly concert.

In the place of this fair and equitable proposal, the Russian Cabinet suggests that the three Powers who proposed the separate treaties between Austria and Russia, and Prussia and Russia, previously to the general treaty of Vienna, should meet together, and that France and Great Britain should be afterward informed of the result of their deliberations.

There are two reasons, either of which would be sufficient to condemn this suggestion:

1. The treaties in question, taken apart from the provisions inserted in the general treaty of Vienna, have reference only to material objects—the use of the banks of rivers, the regulations for towing paths, the free passage of merchandise from one province to another, and such other matters of convenience and commerce. No political developments or details are contained in them.

2. It is obvious that such a conference would place Austria in a false position, and be inconsistent with her relations to France and Great Britain.

His Majesty the Emperor of Austria therefore, with a proper sense of his own dignity, has at once rejected the Russian proposal.

In communicating their views to Prince Gortschakoff, it remains to Her Majesty's Government to discharge an imperative duty.

It is to call his Excellency's most serious attention to the gravity of the situation and the responsibility which it imposes upon Russia.

Great Britain, Austria and France have pointed out the urgent necessity of putting an end to a deplorable state of things which is full of danger to Europe. They have at the same time indicated the means which, in their opinion, ought to be employed to arrive at this termination, and they have offered their co-operation in order to attain it with more certainty.

If Russia does not perform all that depends upon her to further the moderate and conciliatory views of the three Powers—if she does not enter upon the path which is opened to her by friendly counsels, she makes herself responsible for the serious consequences which the prolongation of the troubles of Poland may produce.

I am, etc.,

RUSSELL.

THE RUSSIAN REPLY.

A telegram from Paris of September 14th, says: "Baron "

de Budberg handed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon the Russian reply to the last French note. According to a statement in the *Nation*, the reply of Russia avoids reverting to a discussion of the six points, in consideration of the harmony of the Cabinets upon that subject. Neither does the reply refer to the question of the armistice or the Conference. The *Nation* also states that Prince Gortschakoff confines himself to dis-

cussing the expediency of applying the measures claimed on behalf of Poland by the three Powers. The tone of the reply is very conciliatory. Baron Budberg has received a long memoir on the internal organization of the Russian Empire, which will be communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys."

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